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Executive Summary
Evaluation across time is a recurrent and highly contentious topic in economics. The
analysis of the profitability of public projects was introduced by Jules Dupuit, a french
engineer. Dupuit's concept of cost-benefit analysis has also been used to evaluate the
long-term effects of climate change. Due to the fact of today incurring costs and long-
term benefits occurring in the future, the results from such long-term evaluations depend
crucially from the chosen intertemporal welfare criterion. The publication of the Stern
Review in 2006 has brought the ethical dimension of this issue to the fore and provoked a
heated dispute. But it seems that some contributions dealing with the Stern Review, and
the Review itself, mixed up normative and positive issues to defend the own position.
In two recent contributions in Environmental and Resource Economics, there was dis-
pute about intertemporal welfare economics between Partha Dasgupta and John Roemer
about the correct interpretation of the topic. The aim of this work is to bring together
economic and philosophical reasoning about justice and intergenerational equity in the
context of climate change. So we adopt the normative view in order to present the most
important ethical issues that, particularly in the context of climate policy, are most rele-
vant for the choice of intertemporal discounting. The main purpose of this paper therefore
is, to examine the ethical content of the existing justifications for unequal treatment of
generations distinguishing between ethically less and more convincing reasons for inter-
generational discounting. We use a simple axiomatic framework to derive our conclusions.
From our perspective, less convincing reasons for discounting are the description of
actual behavior, the inclusion of a positive discount rate in order to prevent over-saving
and some axiomatic justification based on Pareto-based arguments and completeness of
an ordering requirements. More convincing arguments for discounting are the possible
extinction of human mankind and the two axiomatic justifications based on egalitarian
equivalence and the protection of the present.
This "justification" for intergenerational discounting essentially is as follows: Equal
treatment of infinitely many generations in social evaluation is not possible if one wants
to have egalitarian-equivalent consumption levels and/or protection of the present. These
two normative postulates both are equity oriented. The conflict is between different equity
norms.
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die Bewertung von ökonomischen Projekten mit langem Zeithorizont ist ein ebenso
lang wie heftig diskutiertes Thema in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Pionier bei der
Untersuchung der Profitabilität von öffentlichen Projekten war der im 19. Jahrhun-
dert lebende französische Ingenieur Jules Dupuit. Dupuits Konzept der Kosten-Nutzen-
Analyse wurde auch zur Abschätzung der langfristigen Effekte des Klimawandels angewen-
det. Aus der Tatsache heraus, dass Kosten von Vermeidungsmaßnahmen heute anfallen,
der Nutzen jedoch erst in ferner Zukunft, spielt die Wahl des intertemporalen Wohlfahrt-
skriteriums eine entscheidende Rolle. Die Publikation des Stern Reports 2006 hat die
ethische Dimension des Problems betont und eine hitzige Debatte entfacht. Es scheint
allerdings, dass einige Beiträge zu dieser Debatte, wie auch der Stern Report selbst,
normative und positive Argumente vermischen, um die eigene Position zu stärken.
In zwei kürzlich in der Fachzeitschrift Environmental and Resource Economics veröf-
fentlichten Beiträgen stritten Partha Dasgupta und John Roemer über die korrekte Inter-
pretation der intertemporalen Wohlfahrtsökonomik. Unser Ziel ist es zu dieser Debatte
beizutragen. Dabei wollen wir ökonomische und philosophische Argumente im Kontext
der intertemporalen Evaluation des Klimawandels zusammenführen. Das wesentliche An-
liegen dieser Arbeit ist, die ethische Stichhaltigkeit der vorgetragenen Argumente für oder
gegen eine Ungleichbehandlung der Generationen zu überprüfen. Dabei verwenden wir
einen einfachen axiomatischen Ansatz, um unsere Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen.
Aus unserer Sicht sind die Beschreibung des von Individuen beobachteten Verhal-
tens, die Verwendung einer positiven Diskontrate zur Vermeidung exzessiv hoher Spar-
quoten und einige axiomatische Ansätze zur Begründung einer Ungleichbehandlung un-
terschiedlicher Generationen nicht hinreichend überzeugend. Die Möglichkeit des Ausster-
bens der menschlichen Spezies und die zwei Axiome der egalitären Äquivalenz und des
Schutzes der heutigen Generation sind hingegen stichhaltiger. Eine Gleichbehandlung
unendlich vieler Generationen ist nicht möglich, falls egalitär-äquivalente Konsumpfade
angestrebt werden oder die gegenwärtige Generation beschützt werden soll. Beide nor-
mativen Postulate basieren auf Fairness-Überlegungen.
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I Introduction
E
valuation across time is a recurrent and highly contentious topic in economics.
The analysis of the profitability of public projects was introduced by Jules Dupuit,
a french engineer (Sandmo, 2011).1 Dupuit's concept of cost-benefit analysis has also
been used to evaluate the long-term effects of climate change. Due to the fact of today
incurring costs and long-term benefits occurring in the future, the results from such long-
term evaluations depend crucially from the chosen intertemporal welfare criterion. The
publication of the Stern Review in 2006 has brought the ethical dimension of this issue
to the fore and provoked a heated dispute. But it seems that some contributions dealing
with the Stern Review, and the Review itself, mixed up normative and positive issues to
defend the own position.
The debate about an "appropriate" discounting rate can characterized as a sharp di-
chotomy: On the one hand there are economists (e.g. William Nordhaus), who refuse
ethical principles in determining the discount rate and who rely on the "invisible hand"
of the market which determines the interest rate (the descriptive, positive approach).2 On
the other hand no less renowned economists like (e.g. Nicholas Stern), who refuse a pro-
hibition of mixing up economics with philosophy (the prescriptive, normative approach)
(Buchholz and Schumacher, 2010). While the descriptive approach to discounting favors
observable market rates, the prescriptive approach argues "that market rates cannot be
used when looking across cohorts" (Aldy et al., 2010, p. 912). The participants in this
debate have variously accused each other of ignorance of basic scientific knowledge (see
Stern (2008)), "subconsciously" undertaking analysis to confirm the policy position of
the UK Government (see Weitzman (2007)), or even trying to rekindle the British Em-
pire (see Nordhaus (2007)). Independently, more recent contributions have shown that
the discounting debate was not the only problem that needs to be reconciled. The main
driver of dissonance in this strand of literature was the different interpretation of welfare
economics. A prominent example is the reply by Partha Dasgupta on a suggestion in
Roemer (2011) to use "sustainability" as a social welfare functional in order to avoid the
weak ethical foundations of discounted utilitarianism. Dasgupta states, that Roemer is
seriously affected by moral fundamentalism and that "he appears not to be able to read
other. He [Roemer (2011)] seems to think that intergenerational welfare economics can
be conducted satisfactorily only if it is confined to those theories that invoke his Ethical
1Dupuit analyzed 1844 how an estimate for the social profitability of a public project (e.g. a bridge)
could be obtained. He mentioned, that costs are monetary but benefits are not and suggested the
calculation by relying on utility (and therefore willingness to pay). His evaluation of a bridge as a public
good "is the first example in the literature of an [. . . ] cost-benefit analysis of a public project that is
based on a rigorous theoretical foundation" (Sandmo, 2011, p. 156).
2The argumentation is based on the work of Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and his "three reasons". The
first reason is that people in average expect that more resources will be available for consumption in the
future. The second reason is the shortsightedness of people underestimating future needs and the third
reason is the "roundabout production", i.e. the idee that "trees produce more timber when one lets them
grow longer, so other methods of production will be more productive when extend in time" (Sandmo,
2011, p. 185).
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Observer" (Dasgupta, 2011, p. 491). This writing is partly even more loaded than the
debate about the discount rate.
In this paper, we adopt the normative view in order to present the most important
ethical issues that, particularly in the context of climate policy, are most relevant for the
choice of the appropriate method of intertemporal evaluation (see also Roemer (2011)), for
an excellent defense of the ethical position). Both controversies around ethical questions
that we have outlined above have been discussed for almost as long as cost-benefit analysis
exist. The main topic of this discussion between economists (e.g. Pigou (1912); Ramsey
(1928)) and philosophers (e.g. Sidgwick (1874) and Broome (1992, 1994)) is, whether it
could be ethically justified to give later generations a lower weight than earlier ones or,
to put it otherwise, whether intergenerational discounting is ethically defensible at all.
From the viewpoint of many philosophers, intergenerational discounting is "a device for
unjustly promoting our own interests at the expense of our descendants" (Broome, 1994,
p. 128). Basic fairness norms, i.e. impartiality, non-discrimination and equal treatment
rule out the discounting practice. This means, that future levels of well-being ought not
to be discounted just for the reason that they are on a different location on the time
axis, everything else equal. Opposition against discounting can also be found among
economists. Arthur Pigou held the viewpoint that "there is wide agreement that the
State should protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of our
irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants" (Pigou,
1932, pp. 29-30), a sentence similar to Ramsey's famous "lack of imagination". Robert
Solows argumentation against intergenerational discounting of utility is in line with Pigou
and Ramsey, stating that "[I]n social decision making, however, there is no excuse for
treating generations unequally, and the time-horizon is, or should be, very long" (Solow,
1974a, p. 9). The supporters of intergenerational discounting often argue with the "fact",
that future generations will be richer than our and hence it is legitimate to discount their
well-being (Dasgupta, 2011), an argument that "puts the cart before the horse. We do not
know that future societies will be "richer" than we are: whether or not that occurs will
be an outcome of the policies we decide to implement - it cannot be taken as a premise"
(Roemer, 2011, p. 374). However, the true ethical meaning of the argumentation has not
been made explicit and sometimes it has even called into question (e.g Roemer, 2011),
provoking harsh reactions from the opposite side.
The main purpose of this paper therefore is, to examine the ethical content of the ex-
isting justifications for unequal treatment of generations distinguishing between ethically
less and more convincing reasons for intergenerational discounting. After this introduction
we present the framework in section II. Then we will compare less and more convincing
reasons for intergenerational discounting in the sections III and IV. Finally, we draw some
tentative conclusions in section V.
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II The Framework
As common in the literature we assume that ct denotes well-being in each period t =
1, 2, . . . . This means that the vector of various determinants of well-being, i.e. material
consumption, leisure, environmental quality etc, is mapped into the real-valued indicator
ct. The severe problems of measurement and aggregation of ct are not treated in this
chapter.3 It is only for terminological convenience, that in the following the variable ct
will be identified with consumption in period t . Time is discrete, with each period of time
t = 1, 2, . . . representing just the lifespan of one single generation. So generations do not
overlap, and for the sake of simplification, we suppose that population is constant over time
thus neglecting the ethical aspects of population change.4 If some technology and some
initial resource endowment are given there is a class Γ of bounded paths C = (c1, c2, . . . )
of well-being (i.e. "consumption") of an infinite number of non-overlapping generations
and for all t. In our framework R denotes a reflexive and transitive binary Social Welfare
Relation (SWR) (quasi-order) on Γ with ∼ as its symmetric and P as its asymmetric
part. If R is also complete it is called a Social Welfare Order (SWO) (order). R is
represented by an intertemporal Social Welfare Function (SWF) W (.) defined on Γ if
W (C(2)) ≥ W (C(1) ⇔ C(2)RC(1) for all C(1), C(2) ∈ Γ.
Roemer (1996) shows that if W (.) respects cardinal-unit-comparable information, it
can be represented as a utilitarian social welfare function. Most frequently intertemporal
evaluation is performed using discounted utilitarian social welfare functional, which gives
utility of future generations less weight than utility of earlier ones. This type of social
welfare functions is defined by




In (1) the function u(ct) again represents utility of consumption and (δt)t=1,2,... is a non-
increasing sequence of utility discount factors with
∑∞
t=1 δt < ∞. These utility discount
factors indicate how much utility in period t counts in terms of period 1. Therefore,
δ1 = 1 and, if δt = 1 for all t = 1, 2, . . . , undiscounted utilitarianism is obtained as a
special case of (1). Traditionally, (δt)t=1,2,... is assumed to fall geometrically, i.e. δt = δt−1
where δ = 1
1−ρ and ρ ≥ 0 is the constant discount or time preference rate.5
3d`Aspremont and Gevers (1977) offer a very comprehensive axiomatic approach towards different
social welfare functionals. Roemer (1996) summarizes the extensive literature and contributions that
deal with the measurability of well-being and its relevance for social welfare functional in a very elegant
manner.
4We refer the reader who is interested in situations with a changing population to Blackorby et al.
(1995).
5We emphasize this point, because there is seemingly a remaining confusion of what is being dis-
counted with the discount rate or the discount factor.
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In applied economic research, an isoelastic von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), is assumed. This was the case in e.g.









1−η if η ≥ 0 and η 6= 1
ln(ct) if η = 1
(3)
To discuss the properties of discounted utilitarianism, we consider a very simple linear
growth model with α > 1 as the time-invariant productivity parameter and with kt as the
(physical) capital stock in period t. If kt is the capital stock available to generation t, it
hands over the capital stock kt+1 = α(kt − ct) to the subsequent generation t+ 1.
III Less Convincing Reasons for Discounting
A Discounting as a Description of Actual Behavior
The anti-ethicist position held by many economists rests upon the belief that economic
valuation should be based on the (revealed) preferences and observable behavior of actual
people who discount their own future utility and that of their descendants and that it
should not be influenced by a purely abstract and eventually subjective ethical guidance
like, for instance, intergenerational equity. The position can be summarized with the
words of William Nordhaus: "I would interpret the baseline trajectory, form a conceptual
point of view, as one that rpresents the outcome of market and policy factors as they
currently exists. In other words, the DICE model is an attempt to project from a positive
perspective [. . . ] [and] this approach does not make a case for the social desirability of the
distribution of incomes over space or time under existing conditions" (Nordhaus, 2008,
p. 174).
The ethically oriented counter-position, also followed by many eminent economists,
wants to keep ethical reflection within economics. Beside that one could note, that also
the utilitarian social welfare functional is a normative concept per se, a fact that seems to
be concealed by the positive economists, there are various arguments against the positive
position. First, intergenerational evaluation refers to the treatment of unavoidably passive
third parties and thus is not possible without ethics. Second, the picture of the selfish
homo oeconomicus is antiquated as there are "other-regarding preferences" and their
normative foundations are to be taken serious. And third, rational individuals want to
make their ethically motivated choices in a coherent way The standard tools of economics
are capable to deal with the properties (= foundations and implications) of different
welfare criteria (in a dialectic process aiming at a "reflexive equilibrium" (Rawls (1971)
4
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and w.r.t. intertemporal evaluation especially Asheim (2010)). Therefore, economists
should not prescribe specific normative judgments but they can help to make an ethical
valuation more transparent and profound. As a consequence for the discounting debate,
economists should also take into account the normative underpinnings of intergenerational
discounting and not solely relying on observable behavior.
B Discounting as Means to Prevent Over-Saving
Applying a discounted utilitarian criterion is held to be an appropriate safeguard to
avoid excessive savings of earlier generations. This widely held view dates back to Rawls
(1971) who discussed (and refused) the applicability of his "difference principle" in the
context of intergenerational equity. This is particularly clear if we start from a constant
consumption path and any generation t = 2, 3, . . . has an equal increase in consumption
. Then given
∑∞
t=1 δt < ∞, the level of a welfare-improving investment in period 1
naturally is restricted by sˆ = (
∑∞
t=1 δt)  which protects generation 1. But, as explained
above, along non-constant consumption paths the same effect may also be brought about
with undiscounted social welfare functions. Moreover, if the utility function and the time
discount factors are fixed, discounted utilitarianism mitigates but not necessarily avoids
excessive savings of the first generation. We will show this using a linear growth model
where the capital stock kt+1 that generation t hands over to generation t + 1 is given by
kt+1 = α(kt − ct). Here, α is a productivity parameter which is assumed to be constant
over time and which indicates the marginal rate of transformation between consumption
in period t and period t+ 1. If kt is the initially given capital endowment of generation 1






holds. Just as before we start from a constant consumption path (c, c, . . . ) and assume
that generation 1 makes an additional saving of s units of consumption. Then it directly
follows from (4) that this enables any subsequent generation to increase its consumption
by (α−1)s units. If we now consider the special case of an isoelastic utility function with




δt−1 ln(c+ (α− 1)s) = ln(c− s) + δ
1− δ ln(c+ (α− 1)s) (5)
By an easy calculation the level of savings which maximizes (5) is
s∗ =
δα− 1
α− 1 c (6)
For even not quite eccentric values of δ and α, as e.g. δ = 0.9 and α = 1.25, (6) implies
that generation 1 would be forced to sacrifice 45 % of its initial consumption to make
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future generations better off. If the productivity parameter α goes to infinity, the level of
savings converges to δc which clearly shows that fixed social preferences will not prevent
overburdening of generation 1 in any case, i.e. independent of the underlying technology.
Concerning their ability to deal with the danger of excessive saving, the difference between
undiscounted and discounted utilitarianism thus turns out to be less fundamental than
might appear at first sight.
Stern (2006) rejects this ethical consideration for intergenerational discounting as not
convincing and ad hoc. Discounting is not indispensable to avoid excessive saving. To
demonstrate this property we rely on the linear growth model outlined above. The first










It follows from (8) that the same optimal path is obtained for different combinations
of δ and η. In particular, the optimal solution, which results for some originally given
parameter values δ and η, can also be implemented without any pure time discount, i.e.
δ = 1 , by-choosing a different inequality aversion parameter η˜ which is
η˜ =
η lnα
lnα + ln δ
. (9)
This interchangeability of δ and α that, when choices among consumption paths are
at stake, the gap between undiscounted and discounted utilitarianism is less deep than
usually suspected.
In the analysis of (static) distributional problems inequality aversion of social prefer-
ences usually is measured through the elasticity of marginal utility η. Therefore one could
raise the claim, that economists should not make things unnecessarily complicated in the
intergenerational context by introducing a second instrument for the same purpose.
Stern (2006), in contrast to much previous work on climate change, explicitly ad-
dressed the ethical dimension of intergenerational evaluation which in particular meant
that it in principle adopted the equal treatment postulate for generations deeply rooted
in the prescriptive school. Therefore, in Stern's approach the elasticity of marginal utility
η automatically became the main tool for bringing about an ethically acceptable balance
of interest between different generations. But, somewhat surprisingly, the highly crucial
choice of η was not discussed explicitly from the ethical viewpoint. In this context the re-
flections remained rather scanty, and no convincing normative justification for specifically
choosing as inequality aversion index in the main part of the empirical study was given.
At the central place of the Report (see (Stern, 2006, p. 184)) there is only a short remark
that employing η = 1 is "in line with recent empirical estimates". Reference, however,
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only is made to two empirical papers by Stern (1977) and Pearce and Ulph (1995), and it
is not explained why such empirical estimates might at all be of much value for making
ethical decisions. So coming to the choice of η , Stern (2006) does not contribute very
much and, to some degree, even neglects his ethical intentions. The discussion after Stern
(2006), however, has shown that ethically relevant arguments on the choice of η can be
found in three different ways.
Adopting an ethical perspective does not exclude that the ethical values of existing
people become the standard of evaluation. Then the debate is not about what seems
to be just in the eyes of an impartial and detached ethical observer but which altruistic
attitudes are prevalent in a society. This approach, on which - without any further
explanation and assessment - Stern (2006) draws on, combines prescriptive and descriptive
elements but observed data do not come from the market-place but from political decisions
where ethical motivations on distributional issues manifest. Although many political
decisions (e.g. on pension reform and the size of the government deficit) clearly affect
distribution between generations, it is very difficult, if not impossible to find out the
level of underlying inequality aversion η. Therefore, results on individual preferences
for redistribution that are obtained from empirical studies on the income tax system are
transferred to the field of intergenerational distribution. The various studies on inequality
aversion as expressed by income tax progressivity give quite different values for η which
in some studies lies in the interval between 1 and 2 (see Evans (2005)) but is lower in
other studies (see Atkinson and Brandolini (2010)). These data certainly give some hint
at existing normative beliefs on inequality. But the attitudes towards income distribution
within a society are multi-dimensional and include aspects of effort and merit which are
absent in the intergenerational context (where instead motivations as responsibility and
stewardship play some role). So it may be doubted whether the estimates for η that
have been obtained from income tax studies can easily be applied to intergenerational
evaluation and climate policy.
C Discounting as an Implication of Plausible Axioms on Intertemporal Wel-
fare Criteria
For consumption paths that are strictly bounded away from zero and bounded above
social welfare according to (1) is a well-defined scalar such that a complete ordering is
obtained. Since Koopmans (1960), discounting and thus unequal treatment has been de-
rived from certain explicitly formulated postulates (or "axioms") which a plausible social
welfare ordering should fulfill.6 The standard set of axioms for discounted utilitarianism
consists of different versions of the Pareto principle, continuity conditions and complete-
ness or cardinal representability postulates. In this section we will discuss the ethical
content of those axioms.
6Note, however, that "Koopmans [. . . ] did not did not argue that the DU [Discounted Utilitarianism]
model was psychologically or normatively plausible; his goal was only to show that under some well-
specified (though arguably unrealistic) circumstances, individuals were logically compelled to possess
positive time preference" (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 356).
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Pareto Principles
The most common version of the Pareto principle is the Strong Pareto (SP):
SP: Given two consumption streams C(1) = (c(1)1 , c
(1)





2 , . . . ) with
c
(2)
t ≥ c(1)t for all t = 1, 2, . . . and c(2)t′ > c(1)t′ for at least one t′ then C(2)PC(1).
A weaker version of SP is represented by Monotonicity (M) where only C(2)RC(1)
is implied by the same conditions. SP is completely uncontested in the case with a finite
number of agents and there is no convincing argument why this should be different in the
infinite case.
Continuity
For any topology τ on the set of consumption paths Γ continuity CONτ of an social
welfare ordering is defined as follows:
CONτ : Given two consumption paths C(1) and C(2) and some sequence (C˜(n))n∈N the
SWO R is τ -continuous if C˜(n)RC(1) for all n ∈ N and limn→∞ C˜(n) = C(2) imply
C(2)RC(1).
The choice of the underlying topology τ may exclude the possibility of equal treatment
of all generations in a direct way.
Consider (generalized) Myopic Topologies τmyo (as in Brown and Lewis (1981)).
These topologies are based on a distance function on Γ xΓ which is of the following type:
dmyo(C
(1), C(2)) = sup
t∈N
λt|c(1)t − c(2)t | (10)
if (λt)t∈R is a sequence of strictly positive real numbers with limn→∞ λt = 0.
The equal treatment condition is captured by Finite Anonymity (FA).
FA: Let pi be a finite permutation of N . For any C = (c1, c2, . . . ) ∈ Γ then (cpi(1), cpi(2), . . . )C˜.
The basic (and almost trivial) incompatibility result then is as follows.
S1: If a SWO R is τmyo−continuous and satisfies SP then it cannot fulfill FA.
Proof. Let C(1) = (c, 0, 0, . . . ) for some c > 0, C(2) = (0, 0, . . . ) and C˜(n) = (c˜1(n), c˜2(n), . . . )
with c˜t(n) = c if t 6= n for all n ∈ R. Assuming FA gives C˜(n)C˜(1) and thus C˜(n)RC(1)
for all n ∈ N. Since dmyo(C(2), C˜(n) = λnc for all n ∈ N we get lim(τmyo)n→∞ C˜(n) = C(2).
CONτmyo then implies C
(2)RC(1). As C(1)PC(2) from SP this is a contradiction.
Given τmyo-continuity results in shifting fixed consumption levels further and further
into the future and is hence tantamount to a negligence in social evaluation. In other
words, discrimination against future generations is already included in this specific type
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of topology. Furthermore, combining FA with SP implies a Dictatorship of the Future
(DF) in the sense of Chichilnisky (1996). Many important topologies, as e.g. the strict
myopic topology in Brown and Lewis (1981) and the product topology have the CONτmyo-
property, except the Sup-Norm Topology τsup which is defined by the distance function
d(C(1), C(2)) = supt∈N |c(1)t − c(2)t |. The Sup-Norm Topology is, unlike the product
topology, "neutral across generations when it comes to measuring the distance between
any pair of elements" (Dasgupta, 2011, p. 481). An equal treatment of all generations in
the underlying topology is only a minimum requirement for the choice of the topology.
It does, however, not provide an ethically meaningful justification for using continuity
conditions as basic axioms of intertemporal evaluation at all and to interpret it as truly
moral axioms. A somewhat more profound reasoning is needed to reconcile continuity
conditions with ethics. Rare attempts in the literature can be found in Banerjee and
Mitra (2008) and Dasgupta (2011). In evaluating the necessity of continuity assumptions,
Banerjee and Mitra write, that "[C]ontinuity has the important normative implication
that rankings of streams are robust to any mis-specification of the streams" (Banerjee
and Mitra, 2008, p. 2). However, this argument implicitly refers to decisions under risk
and it thus departs from the theoretical framework in which a justification for discounted
utilitarianism is usually looked for. Discussing the axiomatic justifications for maximin (by
Hammond) and utilitarianism (by Maskin), Dasgupta write that "for example, pluralists
are drawn to the requirement that W be continuous because it accommodates trade-offs
among people's felicities, something maximin prohibits" (Dasgupta, 2011, p. 485). But
this argument refers to continuity on finite spaces. In the infinite setting continuity is
much more difficult to grasp by intuition and Roemer asks: "Do our intuitions really
grasp the import of requiring this condition on a social preference order?" (Roemer, 2011,
p. 370).
Completeness
In standard microeconomic theory completeness is a feature of the preferences at-
tributed to the rational homo oeconomicus. A person should, for example, know whether
she prefers a consumption bundle A which consists of two apples and four oranges over
a bundle B which consists of four apples and two oranges. Furthermore, completeness
does not require a cut back on other plausible properties of preferences. Completeness is
an attractive feature if one shares the view that a rational ethical observer should always
be able to decide whether one of two arbitrarily given consumption paths is better than
the other (or whether they are equivalent). But it may be questioned how important
completeness really is, i.e. whether "incompleteness (is) such a defect of an ethical the-
ory" (Roemer, 2011, p. 370). So if the task is to choose a best element out of a class
of technically feasible consumption paths one may be content with finding paths that
dominate all other paths for a solely partial ordering, as e.g. the overtaking criterion as
conceived by von Weizsäcker (1965) as a specific version of undiscounted utilitarianism.
To some limited extent choices among consumption paths are well possible without having
9
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completeness. For instance, it is possible to exclude non-sustainable paths in productive
technologies through application of the Suppes-Sen SWR (see Asheim et al. (2001)). From
this perspective, dropping the equal treatment of generations as a basic equity norm may
seem to be a too high price for getting completeness.
Reducing demands and becoming more modest in this way also reflects the view that
it normally is quite unlikely that a single criterion integrates all properties that are nor-
matively desirable. This problem is especially important when there are infinitely many
agents/generations such that - since Diamond (1965) - impossibility results abound in
the literature on intertemporal evaluation. In particular, it has been shown that a social
ordering which fulfils the equal treatment postulate and the strong Pareto principle is
not representable by a cardinal social welfare function when there is an infinite number
of generations (see Basu and Mitra (2003)). Nevertheless, having a numerical welfare
measurement makes the determination of optimal consumption paths simpler and more
transparent, which - from a purely technical viewpoint - is a non-negligible advantage
of discounted utilitarianism. But properly understood this argument cannot claim much
ethical significance and therefore axiomatic approaches are no an ethically substantial
justification of discounting.
IV Convincing Reasons for Unequal Treatment of Generations
A Risk of Extinction of Human Mankind
Since Sidgwick (1874) a major normative justification for intergenerational discounting
refers to the exogenous risk that future generations might not exist (due to an asteroid
or an unavoidable pandemic disease).7
Assume that the ethical observer is behind a veil of uncertainty and then applies ex-
pected utility theory. If the different states of the world will not occur with the same
probability she will take these differences into account when she makes her assessment -
even if, in principle, she is impartial and does not favor any position. In the intergen-
erational context this argument implies that it is ethically well acceptable to give later
generations some lower weight in social evaluation since there is some risk that mankind
may be extinct and thus later generations that can enjoy the fruits of savings today do
not exist. If this risk of extinction from one period to the next is assumed to be constant
over time and equal to pi the discount factor in period t is equal to the probability of
survival δt = (1− pi)t−1. Estimation of clearly is very speculative and a matter of subjec-
tive belief. In particular, Stern (2006) has assumed a probability of 10 % that civilization
may be extinct within one century which implies an annual utility discount rate ρ = 0.1%
p.a. . From the ethical standpoint it may also seem questionable to make such a bet on
the existence of future generations. "Gambling" on the existence of future generations
may seem morally questionable: Is it ethically legitimate to give utility of other people
lower weight because they may die before they get benefit of? Also other risks, related
7See also Dasgupta and Heal (1979) for an extensive discussion on this.
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to changes of technology or preferences, deserve attention too which might take away any
selectivity from this approach.
In the following another route is taken. The idea is to substitute some of the standard
axioms by simple new ones which have a more straightforward ethical appeal. (To keep
things simple minimization of assumptions is not aimed at.)
B Egalitarian Equivalence
The existence of egalitarian-equivalent consumption streams appears in most of the
standard axiomatic approaches (from Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965) to Asheim,
Mitra and Tungodden, 2012, and Mitra and Ozbek, 2012) as an implication of other
assumptions. Egalitarian Equivalence (EE) appears only in some contributions (e.g. Ble-
ichrodt, Rohde and Wakker, 2008) as an explicit axiom.
EE: Given an SWO R for any consumption path C ∈ Γ there is a unique consumption
level cˆ(C) so that(cˆ(C), cˆ(C), . . . )C˜.
Why is EE an important property of social preferences which deserves it to be consid-
ered as an independent axiom? Since Atkinson (1970) egalitarian-equivalent consumption
profiles are a standard tool in the analysis of distributional problems. EE allows it to
compare the degree of inequality aversion of different social preferences: A smaller cˆ(C)
for given C indicates a higher inequality aversion of the underlying SWO. Based on this
it is possible in the standard way to assess the "price" of attaining an equal distribution
of consumption across generations, as usual in Atkinson's approach. Assume that given
a specific technology and some initial endowment there exists a maximum sustainable
consumption level c as well as a unique consumption stream C∗ which is optimal w.r.t.
the given social preferences. Then cˆ(C∗)− c is an indicator of the loss which has to be ac-
cepted in order to achieve constant consumption over time. A weak continuity assumption
which combined with SP gives EE is Scalar ContinuityCONsca (Mitra and Ozbek, 2012).
CONsca: A SWO R is scalar continuous if for any consumption path C ∈ Γ the sets
c ≥ 0 : (c, c, . . . )RC and c ≥: CR(c, c, . . . ) are closed subsets of R.
CONsca furthermore is implied by other types of continuity as Restricted Continuity
CONres (Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden, 2012) or Sup-Norm Continuity CONsup.
The impossibility result which shows the incompatibility between treating generations
equally and having egalitarian-equivalent paths is as follows:
S2: If a SWO R satisfies SP and EE it cannot have FA.
Proof. The assertion directly follows from Basu and Mitra (2003) since cˆ(C) is a
cardinal representation of the underlying SWO.
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Introducing an additional axiom (Constancy of Egalitarian-Equivalent Consumption Over
Time (CE) gives a somewhat weaker, but more intuitive version of S2.
CE: For any path C = (c1, c2, . . . ) ∈ Γ for which an egalitarian-equivalent consumption
level cˆ(C) exists cˆ(cˆ(C), c1, c2, . . . ) = cˆ(C) holds.
CE is ensured by well-known assumptions as Independent Future (IF) or Stationarity
(ST).
S3: If a SWO R satisfies SP, EE and CE it cannot have FA.
Proof. Let C(1) = (ca, cb, cb, . . . ) for some arbitrarily chosen ca and cb with ca < cb
be given. CE gives C(2) = (cˆ(C(1)), ca, cb, cb, . . . )C˜(1) where existence of a unique cˆ(C(1)
follows from EE. SP implies cˆ(C(1) < cb and then C(3) = (cb, ca, cb, cb, . . . )PC(2). Hence,
from transitivity C(3)PC(1). But C(3) is obtained from C(1) by permuting consumption



















In the context of EE there is another impossibility result which is related to another
type of equity norms reflected e.g. by the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle PDT (e.g.
Fleurbaey and Michel, 2001, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2007, and Hara et al.,
2008).
PDT: For any C(1) = (c(11), c
(1)









t1 + ∆ ≤
c
(1)
t2 − ∆ = c(2)t2 some ∆ > 0 and two periods t1 and t2 and c(2)t = c(1)t for all periods
t 6= t1, t2 it holds that C(2)PC(1).
S4 If a SWO R satisfies SP and EE it cannot have PDT.
Proof. Let again C(1) = (ca, cb, cb, . . . ) for some arbitrarily chosen ca and cb with ca








(1) for all t = 1, . . . , s − 1, c(2)s = cb −  and c(2)t = cb for all t = s + 1, s + 2, . . .
where s ≥ 2 and  > 0 are chosen so that cˆ(C(1)) − ca = (s − 2)(cb − cˆ(C(1)) + . This
construction can be made since SP implies ca < cˆ(C(1)) < cb. The path C(2) can be
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obtained from C(1) through a finite sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers so that C(2)PC(1)
from PDT. But SP and EE give that C(2)PC(1) since C(2)P (cˆ(C(1)), cˆ(C(1)), . . . ) and
(cˆ(C(1), cˆC(1), . . . )C˜(1) which is a contradiction.










Note that EE and PDT refer to the same type of equity norms, i.e. equality of
distribution.
C Protection of the Present
The idea that oversaving by the present generation should be avoided in any case (see
Asheim (2010)) can be avoided directly by imposing a Protection of the Present (POP)
axiom.
POP: Let any non-decreasing consumption path C(1) = (c(1)1 , c
(2)
2 , . . . ) be given. Then for




3 , . . . ) with c
(2)
t ≥ c(1)t and c(2)t −c(1)t ≤  for some  > 0 and all t =
2, 3, . . . there exists a consumption level c˜(12C




3 , . . . )C˜
(1).
The ensuing impossibility result is closely related to that in S3.
S5 If a SWO R satisfies SP, POP, CE it cannot have FA.
Proof. Take C(1) = (c, c, . . . ) and 2C(2) = (c+, c+, . . . ) for some  > 0. Then POP
ensures that for (c˜1(2C(2), c + , c + , . . . ) an egalitarian-equivalent path exists which is
equal to C(1). The further proof follows that of S3.
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V Conclusion
The potential normative "justification" for intergenerational discounting which flows
from the previous considerations essentially is as follows: Equal treatment of infinitely
many generations FA in social evaluation is not possible if one wants to have egalitarian-
equivalent consumption levels EE and/or protection of the present POP (combined with
Strong Pareto SP). Note that these two normative postulates both are equity oriented.
The conflict is between different equity norms.
There are some reasons which mitigate this conflict just for practical applications 
but which may also cause new challenges.
(i) DU Light?
If one accepts (as in Stern (2006)) that the risk of extinction justifies an albeit very
small pure discount rate the trade-offs between the standard axioms are no longer very
important: In principle, the equal treatment norm is still endorsed while the fulfillment
of the other ethical postulates does not depend on the level of the pure discount rate.
But ethical reasoning then is shifted to the determination of specific parameters in the
SWF, i.e. to choosing the levels of the discount rate and the elasticity of marginal utility.
Conceptually, this seems to be a less fundamental matter than the "pure" discount rate
debate. The dispute on the Stern Review however shows: There is room for much fierce
controversy also here  and only few systematic ethical arguments are provided in this
context. But see Dasgupta (2008) and Buchholz and Schumacher (2010).
(ii) Endogenous Social Preferences?
If pure intergenerational discounting is used to avoid oversaving discrimination against fu-
ture generations in the social evaluation criterion does not manifest itself in discrimination
w.r.t. consumption opportunities. The pure discounting debate therefore in a certain
sense becomes irrelevant. But the intergenerational distribution of consumption then will
vary extremely with the underlying technology when the discount rate is fixed. E.g. in
the linear growth model with an isoelastic utility function the growth rate of consumption
is g = (αδ)
1
η − 1. If notions of fair intergenerational distributions refer to the level of the
growth rate g (as in Llavador, Roemer and Silvestre, 2008) the discount factor δ has to
depend on the productivity parameter α. Constant consumption over time g = 0 as the
limiting case of growth is achieved by setting δ = 1
α
. Then from the beginning intergen-
erational discounting "has no intrinsic ethical appeal. It is introduced in a purely ad hoc
way to moderate the consequences of the (undiscounted, W.B.) utility criterion" (Rawls,
1971, p. 298). At the same time the usual idea of fixed social preferences incorporating
specific normative postulates has to be abandoned.
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